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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Keith Dean Clark challenges the district court's decision to deny his 
motion to suppress. He asserts that because he carried a flashlight while riding his 
bicycle, which Officer Dennis acknowledged that he observed before initiating the stop, 
he complied with the law that requires that a light be attached to either the bicyclist or 
the bike to illuminate the pathway during certain hours of the day. To the extent the 
statute may be read to require something more than carrying a light to illuminate one's 
path, it is ambiguous and the ambiguity of the meaning of the word "attached" should be 
construed in Mr. Clark's favor. Because Officer Dennis lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Clark, the stop was unlawful and, therefore, all evidence obtained 
after the stop should have been suppressed by the district court. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 20, 2010, Garden City Police Officer Dennis observed two bicyclists 
riding their bikes, one of whom was Mr. Clark. (Tr., p. 7, Ls.4-23, p.8, Ls.18-23.) Both 
bicyclists had lights displayed to the front. (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.) When Officer Dennis 
passed the bicyclists, he determined that Mr. Clark may have been carrying his 
flashlight in his hand. (Tr., p.9, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Clark testified that the flashlight did have 
a loop which was around his hand. (Tr., p.4, Ls.10-17.) Officer Dennis did not recall the 
flashlight having any type of string or loop wrapped around Mr. Clark's hand. (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.10-14.) The district court concluded that Officer Dennis's belief that Mr. Clark only 
carried the flashlight was reasonable. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-19.) 
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The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Clark by Information with the crimes of 
possession of a controlled substance, concealing a dangerous weapon, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Clark filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.30-
31.) He argued that Officer Dennis lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe 
that he violated I.C. § 49-723. (R., pp.23-24.) Therefore, he argued all evidence after 
the unlawful stop should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful stop. (R., pp.23-24.) 
The State responded and argued that a flashlight being carried is not affixed or 
attached to a person. (R., pp .. 33-35.) The State focused its analysis on the term "affix," 
defining it for the district court utilizing Black's Law Dictionary. (R., pp.33-35.) The 
State also argued that even if the flashlight was attached around Mr. Clark's wrist the 
officer was reasonable in his mistake and, therefore, had the authority to stop Mr. Clark. 
(R., pp.33-35.) 
The district court conducted a suppression hearing. (Tr., p.1, L.1-p.12, L.5.) 
Both Mr. Clark and Officer Dennis testified. (Tr., p.1, L.1-p.12, L.5.) The district court 
denied the motion. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-7.) The court determined that: 
Even if it turned out that that light was actually affixed to the bike, as long 
as the officer had a good-faith belief that it looked to him like he was 
holding onto it and that that's the reason that he pulled him over, he was 
entitled to pull him over and check that out. 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.14-19.) The district court went on to hold that as a matter of law the 
statute prohibits a person from holding the flashlight. (Tr., p.15, Ls. 12.) The court 
stated, "the plain language of the statute, which requires that the light be attached, and 
they use the word 'attached to the bicycle or the rider,' that would exclude holding it." 
(Tr., p.15, Ls.9-12.) As further clarification the district court stated, "holding onto the 
flashlight is not the same as having the flashlight attached to the rider." (Tr., p.15, 
Ls.13-15.) 
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Mr. Clark entered into a conditional plea preserving his right to challenge the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.16, Ls.23-25 ) He agreed to 
plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance; in exchange, the State agreed to 
recommend a unified five-year sentence, with one-year fixed, with five years of 
probation. (Tr., p.16, L.22-p.17, L.8.) The district court accepted the plea agreement 
and imposed the recommended sentence. (Tr., p.50, Ls.13-15.) The court suspended 
executing Mr. Clark's sentence and placed him on probation. (Tr., p.50, L.21.) The 
district court filed a Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence reflecting 
the district court's oral pronouncement. (R., pp.59-64.) Mr. Clark timely appealed. (R., 
pp.67-69.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Clark's motion to suppress because Officer 
Dennis lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Clark violated the law 
that requires a bicyclist to have attached to his person or bike a light to illuminate his 
path during certain hours of the day because Officer Dennis observed Mr. Clark holding 
a flashlight properly illuminating the road before initiating the stop? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Clark's Motion To Suppress Because 
Officer Dennis Lacked Reasonable. Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Clark Violated 
The Law That Requires A Bicyclist To Have Attached To His Person Or Bike A Light To 
Illuminate His Path During Certain Hours Of The Day Because Officer Dennis Observed 
Mr. Clark Holding A Flashlight Properly Illuminating The Road Before Initiating The Stop 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Clark's motion to suppress. Prior to 
stopping Mr, Clark, Officer Dennis observed Mr. Clark holding a flashlight illuminating 
the road Therefore, Officer Dennis lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop 
Mr. Clark, and all evidence obtained thereafter should be suppressed, 
B. The Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated " State v. Holland, 
135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, 
the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported 
by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts as found." Id. 
Construction and application of statutes are purely legal questions and, therefore, 
reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332 
(2000); Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho 420 ( 1997). When faced with the interpretation 
of a statute, the appellate court begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. 
State v. Bumight, 133 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging 
in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (2001 ). 
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C. Mr. Clark's Stop Was Unconstitutional Because Officer Dennis Lacked 
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Clark Violated The Law 
Requiring Bicyclist to Illuminate The Path During Certain Hours Of The Day 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Idaho Constitution contains a 
virtually identical provision which protects its citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. ID. CONST. art. I, § 17; State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumed unreasonable and violate 
the provisions of both constitutions. State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003). If 
evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The purpose 
of these constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the 
exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's 
privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). 
An officer may conduct an investigatory stop without violating an individual's 
constitutional rights if, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. 
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 379 (Ct. App. 2003). When challenged, the State 
bears the burden to prove a valid investigatory stop. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260 (Ct. 
App. 2001 ). The State must demonstrate that at the time of the stop the officer 
possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in, or about to 
engage in, criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). "The officer's 
suspicion must be more than a mere hunch[.]" State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 
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515 (2001 ). '"Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped for 
criminal activity."' Wilson v. Idaho Transportation Department, 136 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct 
App. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)). Utilizing 
these limiting principles, when an officer possesses reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
conclude that a bicyclist has committed a traffic infraction, an officer may stop the 
bicyclist. LC.§§ 49-714, 49-1503. 
Idaho requires bicyclists to illuminate the roadway for at least 500 feet in front of 
them between sunset and sunrise and at any other time insufficient lighting exists. I.C. 
§§ 49-903, 49-723. The purpose of the requirement is to improve visibility. See id. 
Idaho Code section 49-723 requires that: 
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-903, Idaho Code, 
shall be operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at 
least five hundred (500) feet to the front. attached to the bicycle or the 
rider, and with a reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle. 
Mr. Clark possessed a light. (Tr., p 9, Ls.7-10.) His light was visible to others for 
the proper distance; however, Officer Dennis believed that the law required more. (Tr., 
p.9, Ls.7-10, p.11, Ls.10-14.) Officer Dennis believed that a string attached to the 
flashlight wrapped around Mr. Clark's wrists would have been sufficient. (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.10-14.) However, the law does not demand this. The purpose of the statute is to 
have a light to illuminate the path in front of the bicyclist. Mr. Clark did what the law 
wanted him to do have a light to illuminate the road in front of him. The flashlight was 
attached to Mr. Clark when he held it in his hand. Officer Dennis lacked reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Clark violated the law requiring him to have attached 
to his person a light to illuminate his path because, before initiating the stop, he 
observed Mr. Clark holding the flashlight. 
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D. Assuming Arguendo That The Statute Is Ambiguous Because Both The District 
Court's Interpretation Requiring A Person To Do More Than Hold A Flashlight 
And Mr. Clark's Interpretation That Holding A Flashlight Meets The Definition Of 
Attaching It To His Person Are Reasonable, The Rule Of Lenity Demands That 
Mr. Clark's Interpretation Control 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the statute is ambiguous because the district 
court's interpretation and Mr. Clark's interpretations are both reasonable, the rule of 
lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Mr. Clark's favor. Thus, holding a 
flashlight would be sufficient to be in compliance with the law. 
"The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read narrowly and, 
where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants." State v. 
Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1999). The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct 
that it makes criminal Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1964). The 
rule of lenity is considered a manifestation of the fair warning requirement under the 
right to due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259. 265-66 (1997); see also 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99 (2008) (citations omitted) ("The rule of lenity states that 
criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants.") and State v. 
Shanks, 139 Idaho 152 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing the applicability of the rule of lenity 
to an ambiguous statute in Idaho). The United States Supreme Court wrote on the 
cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 
(1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
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the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002, As is noted above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the premise 
that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
Justice Scalia further wrote on this premise in a concurring opinion in United 
States v. RJC., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). The concurrence concluded, "that it is not 
consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against 
a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history. Once it is determined that the 
statutory text is ambiguous, the rule requires that the more lenient interpretation 
prevail." Id. at 293 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
Here, the Legislature made its policy clear within in the statute. The statute 
provides: 
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-93, Idaho Code, 
shall be operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at 
least five hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the 
rider, and with a reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle. 
I.C. § 49-723. The purpose of the statute is inherent in the language of the statute - to 
increase visibility by illuminating the pathway during certain hours of the day. I.C. 
§ 49-723. Although there is no indication that the Legislature intended to require that a 
bicyclist's light be securely affixed to something, assuming arguendo, that the statute is 
ambiguous because both the district court's interpretation and Mr. Clark's interpretation 
are reasonable, this Court should interpret the statue utilizing the principles of lenity. 
This Court should find in favor of Mr. Clark and conclude that the Legislature did not 
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require more than that a person illuminate a path while riding a bicycle during certain 
hours of the day; a requirement with which Mr. Clark complied. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Clark respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of Conviction, 
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand for 
dismissal. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011. 
/ 
t;~~:~;:LK~{Lh,t>~, ..... 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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